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CASENOTES

INSURANCE LAW:

OHIO RECOGNIZES TORT DUTY OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BETWEEN AN INSURER AND ITS IN-

SURED-Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272,
452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The economic and social roles of insurance companies are vitally
important to every individual and every business in the United States.'
Society views insurance as the mechanism which transfers the risks of
economic catastrophe and financial hardship to those more capable of
bearing the financial burden-the insurers.2 Insurance also provides the
indemnification which provides the security required to stimulate investment and ultimately the economic growth of all American industries.$ Because the insurance industry plays such an integral role in the
American economy, insurance companies must remain economically
sound. Therefore, an insurance company has a right, as well as a public
duty, to question the validity of all claims.4 No one would benefit if the
insurance industry repeatedly honored fraudulent claims.8
Unfortunately, because of the vast wealth and resources available
to the insurance industry, insureds have often found themselves at the
mercy of their own insurance companies.' As state and federal courts
became aware of this problem, they focused upon protecting the rights
of the insured7 and began providing various legal remedies. 8 In Hoskins
v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,9 the Ohio Supreme Court delineated its
legal remedy for an insured who has suffered harm from a wrongful

1. Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party
Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 164 (1976).
2. Birnbaum & Wrubel, ExtracontractualDamages againstInsurers: An Overview, in ExTRACONTRACTUAL DAMAGES 2 (J. Groves ed. 1983).
3. Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, Strict Liability: A Response to the Gruenberg-Silberg
Conflict Regarding Insurance Litigation Awards, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 310 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Strict Liability].
4. Note, supra note 1, at 164.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 165-67.
7. Strict Liability, supra note 3, at 310.
8. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
9. 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).

Published by eCommons, 1984

159

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:1

denial of a claim upon his or her own insurer. In Hoskins, the Ohio
Supreme Court followed California's lead, 10 and imposed a duty of
good faith and fair dealing upon insurance companies when they handle the claims of insureds." Consequently, since a breach of this legal
duty constitutes a tort,' 2 an insured is no longer limited to the contract
4
amount' s but may now recover extracontractual damages.'
This note will outline the general concepts and developments in
this area of the law, and will analyze the Ohio Supreme Court's legal
remedy set forth in Hoskins. In addition, the practical effects of Hoskins upon the insurance industry and insurance litigation will be
considered.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,'6 Carl Hoskins' insurance

company, Aetna Life, refused to pay health benefits to Mrs. Hoskins
pursuant to a group hospitalization and medical policy." In October of
1977, Mrs. Hoskins was admitted to the medical-surgical unit of the
7
Hocking Valley Community Hospital after suffering from a stroke.'
After more than one year of medical care and physical therapy, she
was transferred from the medical-surgical unit to the hospital's skillednursing unit.' 8 This transfer was made for the hospital's convenience
and to facilitate Mrs. Hoskins' physical therapy.' 9
On March 2, 1979, a year after Mrs. Hoskins was transferred to
the skilled-nursing unit, Mr. Hoskins received notice that his wife's
medical coverage had expired. Aetna informed him that the transfer to
the skilled-nursing unit was considered a transfer to a "convalescent
facility" and coverage in such a facility expired after 365 days.
After numerous attempts to explain that Mrs. Hoskins was still
receiving "hospital" treatment, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the
Hocking County Common Pleas Court. Alleging that Aetna's refusal to
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 276, 452 N.E.2d at 1319 (1983).
Id. at 276, 452 N.E.2d at 1320.
See infra text accompanying notes 7 & 28.
See infra text accompanying notes 29-31.
6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
Id. at 273, 452 N.E.2d at 1317.
Id. at 272, 452 N.E.2d at 1317.

18. Id.
19. Mrs. Hoskins' physical therapy required the use of a tilt table which was located at the
opposite end of the hospital from the medical-surgical unit. Her physician ordered the transfer
exclusively to facilitate convenient access to the tilt table since "[i]t was quite an ordeal to move
all this equipment from the [physical therapy] department to [Mrs. Hoskins'] room every day."
Id.
20. Id. at 273, 452 N.E.2d at 1317-18.
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pay the hospital bill was a breach of the insurance policy, the Hoskinses prayed for compensatory and punitive damages. 1 The trial court
ruled that the complaint did not properly set forth a cause of action in
tort that justified an award of punitive damages. 2 The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the Hoskinses in the sum of $184,000 which was
reduced by the trial judge to $20,792.91.23
The Hoskinses appealed to the Court of Appeals for Hocking
County, which reversed the trial court decision in part and remanded
the case, holding that the issue of punitive damages should have gone
to the jury. The appellate court held that although punitive damages
are generally unavailable for breach of contract, 4 when the breach
constitutes a willful, wanton, and malicious tort, punitive damages may
be assessed.2 On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court chose not to follow
the exception noted by the court of appeals, and for the first time held
that insureds may sue their own insurance companies in tort, premised
on a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 6
III.
A.

BACKGROUND--RECOVERING

DAMAGES

Traditional View

An insurance policy is actually a reverse unilateral contract defining the rights and obligations which exist between the insurance company and its insured. 27 Accordingly, in the event that an insurance policy is breached, the courts are bound by contract law in determining
the appropriate legal remedies. Such legal remedies are generally limited to the face amount of the insurance policy-based on the contract
principle that the legal remedy should merely place the nonbreaching
party in the position he or she would have been in had the contract
been fully performed.2 8 In the famous English case of Hadley v. Bax21. Id. at 274, 452 N.E.2d at 1318.
22. Id.
23. Id. The judgment was reduced after a judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion.
24. See Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1922); Tibbs v. National
Home Constr. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977).
25. Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 353 (Ct. App. Hocking County, Ohio, released Jan.
21, 1982). See also Sweet v. Grange Mut. Casualty Co., 50 Ohio App. 2d 401, 364 N.E.2d 38
(1975); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (C.P. Franklin County 1970).
26. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 276, 452 N.E.2d at 1319.
27. Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 2, at 2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 55, comment a, illustration 1 (1981)). In exchange for the insured's prepaid consideration,
the insurance company promises to pay for losses that may be incurred by the insured. Id. Nar-

rowly viewed, however, an insurance policy simply defines the contractual obligations between the
insurance company and its insured. Id.
28. See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1964); C. MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 137 (1935); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d

ed. 1968
Supp. 1983). 1984
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endale,2 the court expanded on this general rule and delineated the
parameters for the recovery of consequential damages 0 in contract
cases. The court allowed for the recovery of consequential damages
"such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable
result of the breach of it." 1 Most courts have subsequently adopted a
narrow interpretation of the foreseeability portion of this test. 2 Since
courts adopt a narrow view of foreseeability, this portion of the Hadley
v. Baxendale test33 is very difficult to prove in most contract cases. Accordingly, although an exception for the recovery of consequential damages exists, such damages are generally unavailable in breach of insurance policy cases because of the contract law limitations on their
recovery. 84
B. Modern Trends
Historically, an insurance company had little to lose by wrongfully
denying a claim. Under traditional contract law, an insurance company
would only be responsible for the face amount of the contract plus interest if a court found that the company had breached a contract by
wrongfully denying a claim.35 Obviously, it was worth the gamble, in
many cases, to simply deny the claim, and hope that a court would find
the claim invalid.36 In response to the inadequacies of the limited recovery available under contract law, courts and legislatures have attempted to deter abuses. 7
Courts have expounded five possible legal theories in an attempt to
29. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
30. Consequential damages are those damages which do not flow directly or "naturally"
from the parties' breach, but are due to some special circumstances. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-5 at 524-25; E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14 at
874-75 (1982). Cf. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1977). Examples of consequential damages are: lost profits, loss of employment, and emotional distress. See generally Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 2,
at 3.
31. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
32. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 12.14 at 876. See, e.g., Jefferson County Burial
Soc'y, Inc. v. Curry, 237 Ala. 548, 187 So. 723 (1939); Clark v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 245
Ky. 579, 53 S.W.2d 968 (1932); Bye v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 164 (La. Ct.
App.), writ denied, 320 So. 2d 208 (La. 1975); Haas v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App.
332, 41 N.E.2d 263 (1941).
33. 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
34. Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 2, at 3-4.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id.
37. Enacted statutes usually permit recovery of punitive damages and attorney fees for the
insurance company's wrongful denial of a valid claim. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238
(1980); IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (West 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (Vernon Supp.
1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-359 (1978); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1981).
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provide adequate relief to an insured.3 8 First, some courts have expanded upon contract law to permit recovery of damages (including
consequential damages) proximately caused by the breach of a policy."
A second approach has been to permit recovery beyond policy limits by
finding a cause of action in fraud. 0 Since this is a cause of action pursuant to tort law, the contract law limitations on recovery are not applicable. A third theory is that an insured may recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the wrongful denial. 1
Fourth, a recovery beyond policy limits may be possible by claiming
the insurance company improperly interfered with the insured's property rights.42 The final theory adopted in many states is the tort theory
that the insurance company has acted in bad faith. 4s The Ohio Supreme Court adopted this tort theory for first party claims" in Hoskins
v. Aetna Life Insurance Co."
C.

Implied-by-Law Duty of Good Faith

Recovery under the tort theory of bad faith was first allowed in
the seminal case of Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. 46 In

38. Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 2, at 5.
39. There are three principles which underlie contract law. First, both parties stand at arm's
length and have equal bargaining power, and therefore can provide for any foreseeable problems.
Second, money is always available at a reasonable interest rate. Third, it is advantageous to have
a standard measure of damages. Some courts, which hold a liberalized view of contract law, simply hold that these principles are not applicable in insurance contracts and therefore permit recovery of consequential damages. See Note, supra note 1, at 168-71.
40. Id. at 171-74. "A cause of action for fraud has been approached from two distinct
standpoints-fraud in the inducement and fraudulent breach of contract." Id. at 171.
41. Id. at 174-77. See. e~g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). This is also a tort theory and, therefore, recovery is not limited to the
policy amount.
42. See T. RILEY, Proving Punitive Damages: The Complete Handbook 69 (1981). Riley
implies that although no court has adopted this approach, it is a possible cause of action. The
rationale is that because an insurance company has denied an insured's claim, and therefore
caused conversion of the insured's assets in order to meet financial obligations, the company has
improperly interfered with the insured's property rights. Id.
43. See Note, supra note 1, at 177-81 and infra text accompanying notes 45-61.
44. A first party claim is a claim which the insured makes upon his or her own insurance
company because of a personal loss. A third party claim is a claim based on the company's contractual obligation to protect its insured from liability to a third person for injury to a person or
property. Third party claims include the duty to settle reasonable claims. See generally DuBois &
Bronson, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First Party Actions, 40 INs. COUNS. J. 290, 291-93
(1973).
45. 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
46. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). Comunale involved a third party claim. Because
of the inherent differences between first party and third party cases, it is not surprising that recovery for bad faith first emerged in the third party cases. Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The
Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833, 834 (1982). In the third party cases, the
insured has no control over the litigation and settlement process. Therefore, since the insurer has
has a corresponding
control,by
it also
Published
eCommons,
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that case, the insurance company wrongfully refused to defend its insured in a personal injury suit, and wrongfully refused to settle the
claim against the insured for an amount below the policy limits. 47 The
jury returned a judgment in excess of the policy limits against the insured. The insured then assigned his rights against the insurance company to the original plaintiff who sued the insurance company on the
bad faith theory. 48 In permitting the plaintiff-assignee to recover damages equal to the jury verdict, the California Supreme Court held that
there was an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that prohibits either party to an insurance contract from interfering with the
right of the other party to receive the benefits of the agreement. 49 Although the court held that damages in excess of policy limits are permitted when an insurance company breaches this "good faith" duty,
the California Supreme Court adhered to contract principles and denied any recovery of consequential damages beyond the excess judgment amount.50
This new concept of good faith and fair dealing was subsequently
expanded in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 51 As the result of a judgment in excess of the plaintiff's policy limits, the plaintiff suffered
financial loss, a decline in physical and mental health, and subsequently
attempted to commit suicide. 5 The California Supreme Court, apparently outraged at the insurance company's conduct, held that the plaintiff could recover consequential damages for mental distress caused by
the insurance company's breach of the "good faith" duty outlined in
Comunale.5 8 The court emphasized the general tort rule "that the injured party may recover for all detriment caused whether it could have
been anticipated or not."' 4
One year after the Comunale decision, the Ohio Supreme Court
also recognized that an insurance company owes a duty of good faith to
its insured in third party claims. In Hart v. Republic Mutual Insur-

first party cases. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court also recognized this third party duty in Hoskins, 6
Ohio St. 3d at 275, 452 N.E.2d at 1319 (citing Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111,
118 (6th Cir. 1976)).
47. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 657, 328 P.2d at 200.

48. Therefore, the plaintiff-assignee stood in the shoes of the insured. Id. at 657-58, 328
P.2d at 200.
49. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
50. Id. at 661, 328 P.2d at 202.
51. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). In Crisci, the insurance company rejected a $9,000 settlement offer. Although Mrs. Crisci's insurance policy had a $10,000
limit, the judgment against her was for $101,000. Id. at 428, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.

52. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
53. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
54. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/8
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ance Co.,5 " the Ohio Supreme Court stated in the syllabus that "[an
insurance] company is liable to respond in damages to its insured if it
fails to act in good faith with respect to the settlement of such a
claim."5 6 Subsequent Ohio decisions further explained this implied-by7
law duty of good faith.5
Although the Comunale line of cases provided adequate relief in
third party cases, first party claims were still limited by general contract principles. If an insurance company wrongfully denied coverage of
a first party claim, and the insured subsequently suffered financial,
physical, or mental hardships due to the denial of insurance proceeds,
the insured could not successfully bring a cause of action under the
duty of good faith theory.5 8 The California Supreme Court decision in
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.," however, finally extended recovery
based on the implied-by-law duty of good faith and fair dealing to the
breaches of insurance policies in first party claims.
In Gruenberg, the insurance company refused to pay a claim
under an insurance policy covering fire loss.60 The California Supreme
Court held that despite the inherent differences between first and third
party claims, a breach of either is "merely two different aspects of the
same duty.""' The decision in Gruenberg, therefore, finally provided
authority to permit recovery in first party claims under the bad faith

55. 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949). Hart involved an insurer's wrongful refusal to
settle a claim within the insured's policy limits. The jury subsequently rendered a judgment in
excess of the policy limit and the insured was financially responsible for the entire judgment. Id.
at 186-87, 87 N.E.2d at 348-49.
56. Id. at 185, 87 N.E.2d at 348.
57. Until Hoskins, all of the Ohio cases which recognized an implied duty of good faith
were cases involving third party claims. See, e.g., Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d
111 (6th Cir. 1976); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d
759 (1980); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trainor, 33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294 N.E.2d 874 (1973); Slater
v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962); Saberton v. Greenwald, 146
Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946).
In a recent decision, the Ohio Supreme Court extended this duty to issuers of financial responsibility bonds when they handle and pay the claims of injured third parties. Suver v. Personal
Serv. Ins. Co., 11 Ohio St. 3d 6, 462 N.E.2d 415 (1984). The case is interesting because the court
created a duty between the third party and the surety despite the lack of privity which the dissent
in Suver thought was critical to the result in Hoskins. Id. at 9-10, 462 N.E.2d at 418 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
58. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. The insureds in first party claims were
still limited to the face amount of the policy plus interest.
59. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485. "[T]hat responsibility is not the
requirement mandated by the terms of the policy itself-to defend, settle, or pay. It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by law, under which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in
discharging its contractual responsibilities." Id. at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at
485.
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theory. First party claimants were now able to recover damages traditionally available under tort law: nominal, compensatory, consequential, and ultimately, punitive damages.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The law in Ohio was well established-courts shall impose a duty
of good faith and fair dealing on insurance companies in third party
cases.eS'As with most other states, however, there were no established
legal remedies in first party cases beyond the traditional recovery permitted under contract law. 65
Despite the lack of supreme court authority, several Ohio lower
court decisions hinted at a tort theory for recovering damages caused
by a breach of the insurance contract in first party claims. In Kirk v.
Safeco Insurance Co.,64 the Franklin County Common Pleas Court
found that the actions of an insurer in refusing to pay a claim "were
such as to be a breach of contract amounting to a wilful, wanton and
malicious tort" and awarded punitive damages. 65 This case was followed and cited by the Ashland County Court of Appeals in Sweet v.
Grange Mutual Casualty Co.ee Ultimately, however, both cases emphasized that this contract "tort" required an adequate showing that
the breach was malicious . 7 It is unclear whether the courts were requiring this standard to establish the elements of a "tort" or to fulfill
the requirements for "punitive damages." This confusion, however, became moot with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Hoskins.
In Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., the Ohio Supreme Court
expanded the limited exception provided in Kirke8 and Sweet, 9 and
applied the implied-by-law duty of good faith and fair dealing, previously recognized only in third party claims. 70 Because this implied-bylaw duty of good faith and fair dealing sounds in tort, the Hoskins
court held that punitive damages are recoverable if the necessary elements of punitive damages7 ' are established.72 Although the court

62. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
64. 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (C.P. Franklin County 1970).
65. Id. at 46, 273 N.E.2d at 921.
66. 50 Ohio App. 2d 401, 364 N.E.2d 38 (1975).
67. Sweet, 50 Ohio App. 2d at 406, 364 N.E.2d at 41; Kirk, 28 Ohio Misc. at 46, 273
N.E.2d at 921.
68. Kirk, 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919.
69. Sweet, 50 Ohio App. 2d 401, 364 N.E.2d 38.
70. 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
71. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
72. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 277, 452 N.E.2d at 1320.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/8
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adopted the implied-by-law duty for first party cases, and clearly stated
that extracontractual damages may be recovered, the Hoskins court
held that the requirements for punitive damages were not sufficiently
asserted, 73 and the trial court was therefore correct in denying punitive
74
damages to the Hoskinses.
B. Bad Faith
The Hoskins court, expanding the decision in Hart v. Republic
Mutual Insurance Co.,7 5 and following the California Supreme Court's
decision in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 7 6 created an implied-bylaw duty of good faith in first party claims." Accordingly, an insurance
company which breaches this duty is not only breaching the insurance
contract, but is also breaching a legal duty sounding in tort, thereby
allowing a broader range of recoverable damages. Since Hoskins expanded Hart and followed Gruenberg, it is both appropriate and helpful to refer to third party case law and California decisions in resolving
questions of law spurred by the Hoskins decision.
Because Ohio law now imposes a legal duty on all insurance companies to act in good faith, the question inevitably arises as to what
constitutes good faith. In Hoskins, the court looked to Slater v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.,78 for assistance in determining what constitutes a breach of this duty.7 9 The Slater court stated that the lack of
good faith is the equivalent of bad faith, and that bad faith is difficult
to define. 80 The court, however, attempted to explain the concept of
bad faith, noting that:
[B]ad faith, although not susceptible of concrete definition, embraces
more than bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose,
moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through
some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud. It also
embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive another.8"
The Hoskins court added to the Slater definition of bad faith by requiring that an insurance company's decision be based on the totality
of the circumstances, and that the decision must not be arbitrary or

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 278, 452 N.E.2d at 1322.
Id. at 279-80, 452 N.E.2d at 1322.
152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949).
9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 276, 452 N.E.2d at 1320.
174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962).
Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 276, 452 N.E.2d at 1320.
Slater, 174 Ohio St. at 148, 187 N.E.2d at 46.
Id.
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capricious.82 Although the court never related the specific facts in Hoskins to the Slater requirements," the court nonetheless determined
that Aetna's denial of Mr. and Mrs. Hoskins' health benefits constituted bad faith. 4
C.

Punitive Damages

Because recovery for wrongful denials of first party claims is
grounded in tort, an insured may now sue an insurance company for
punitive damages. Since bad faith cases, whether first or third party
claims, focus increasingly on the conduct of the insurer rather than the
injury to the insured,8 5 punitive damages are an appropriate remedy.
Unlike compensatory damages which merely compensate the insured,
punitive damages, in "bad faith" cases, will serve the additional purposes of retribution, punishment, and deterrence.8 6
It is imperative to note that there is a distinction, however, between the type of conduct which constitutes a breach of the legal duty
of good faith,87 and the type of conduct which gives rise to punitive
damages. 88 Although Aetna breached its legal duty of good faith, the
Hoskins court denied the plaintiffs' recovery of punitive damages because they failed to prove that the insurance company's conduct was
actually malicious.8 9
Although, in denying punitive damages, the majority in Hoskins
did not consider Aetna's conduct malicious, 90 Justice Clifford Brown's

82. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 277, 452 N.E.2d at 1320.
83. Id. at 278-79, 452 N.E.2d at 1321-22.
84. Id. at 278, 452 N.E.2d at 1321. As noted, the Hoskins court never specifically stated
that the insurance company breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. Such a conclusion,
however, is gleaned from a reading of the entire case. See, e.g., id. at 272, 452 N.E.2d at 1316
("A breach of this duty will give rise to a cause of action in tort against the insurer."); id. at 278,
452 N.E.2d at 1321 ("In view of the law as stated above, this court is now able to address the
precise issue raised by this appeal .
85. Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 613, 630 (1979).
86. Id. at 629.
87. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
88. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 277-78, 452 N.E.2d at 1321. See also Silberg v. California
Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462-63, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974).
89. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 278-79, 452 N.E.2d at 1322. The basic elements required for
a recovery of punitive damages in Ohio are actual malice, fraud, or oppression. Columbus Fin.,
Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 183-84, 327 N.E.2d 654, 658 (1975). Actual malice, as
defined by Ohio law, is "that state of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by
hatred or ill will, a spirit of revenge, retaliation, or a determination to vent his feelings upon other
persons." Pickle v. Swinehart, 170 Ohio St. 441, 443, 166 N.E.2d 227, 229 (1960).
90. "[I]t cannot be found that [the insurance company] acted with actual malice in determining that the skilled nursing unit was a 'distinct part' of the institution." Hoskins, 6 Ohio St.
3d at 278, 452 N.E.2d at 1321.
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separate opiniong' emphasized that the court should consider the public
policies supporting recovery of punitive damages."2 Justice Brown
stated that the public policies underlying an award of punitive damages
include the promotion of public safety, specific deterrence, and general
deterrence. In the last sentence of his opinion, he seems to imply that
punitive damages are especially applicable in bad faith insurance cases,
and that if a jury finds such an award appropriate, the appellate courts
should not overturn the decision."
V.

CONCLUSION

The consequences of Hoskins remain to be seen. Because the Ohio
Supreme Court has essentially created a new cause of action which
now permits recovery in first party cases, it is foreseeable that complaints will now seek tort damages under the duty of good faith theory.
Although the supreme court has expanded the legal remedies available
in insurance cases, it is possible that the court may simultaneously restrict the recovery of punitive damages. Since the Hoskins court refused to award punitive damages while, at the same time, establishing
the implied-by-law duty for first party claims, it is possible that the
court has actually purported to continue awarding insureds for compensatory damages while requiring that a higher standard for recovery of
punitive damages be satisfied.
The impact of this decision will probably affect not only the insurance companies, but the policy owners as well. The public's response,
therefore, may parallel the arguments made for and against the recovery of damages under this new theory. The public surely wants to contravene malicious denials of claims, but it does not desire the corresponding rise in consumer costs which may inevitably result from the
award of punitive damages.
Colleen M. Hunt

91. Justice Brown concurred with the majority in its holding that Aetna breached its implied-by-law duty of good faith, but dissented regarding the punitive damages issue. Hoskins, 6
Ohio St. 3d at 280-81, 452 N.E.2d at 1323.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 281, 452 N.E.2d at 1323.
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